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“In relation to direct taxes, the situations of residents and of non-residents are not, 
as a rule, comparable” (Schumacker, 31). 
“The position is different (…) where the non-resident receives no significant 
income in the State of his residence” (Schumacker, 36). 
“It is settled law that discrimination arises through the application of different rules 
to comparable situations or the application of the same rule to different situations” 
(Wielockx, 17). 
“(...) [I]t needs to be examined whether (…) the difference in treatment of a 
shareholder (…) relates to situations which are not objectively comparable” 
(Manninen, 32). 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
According to a long-established principle of international law, residents and non-
residents for tax purposes are not comparable. 
The Court of Justice of the European Union (hereafter “ECJ”), however, has made 
it clear that, even though this principle stands as a general rule also within the EU, 
there are situations in which comparability between residents and non-residents can 
be set. 
The present research considers to what extent the ECJ has held that such 
comparability occurs, and is formed of five sections: the first section gives account of 
the legal framework of EU freedoms; in the second one, cases where residents and 
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non-residents have been compared are analyzed; the third one provides the analysis 
of cases involving residents who exercised EU freedoms, treated less favorably than 
residents of the same Member State (hereafter “MS”) who did not; the fourth section 
draws categories of ECJ cases, and their differences; the last one provides some 
conclusions. 
 
2. EU FREEDOMS AND THE “NATIONAL TREATMENT” PRINCIPLE 
The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (hereafter “TFEU”) 
provides for that freedom of movement for workers shall be secured within the EU, 
and any discrimination on the grounds of nationality shall be abolished (Art. 45); 
restrictions on the freedom of establishment of nationals of a Member State and of 
companies incorporated under the law of a MS shall be prohibited, the freedom 
applying to restrictions on the setting-up of agencies, branches or subsidiaries (Art. 
49); restrictions on the freedom to provide services shall be prohibited in respect of 
nationals and companies of MSs (Art. 56); and all restrictions on the movement of 
capital between MSs and between MSs and third countries shall be prohibited (Art. 
63).1 
The way through which EU freedoms are enacted is EU law supremacy2: MSs 
cannot discriminate non-nationals nor restrict the exercise of the freedoms, while 
they must grant “national treatment”, i.e. similar treatment in terms of rights and 
obligations between nationals and non-nationals exercising EU freedoms, or between 
nationals who exercised EU freedoms and nationals of the same MS who did not.3 As 
a matter of facts, it is possible that the national exercising the freedoms is 
discriminated or restricted by a rule of the MS where the freedom is exercised: cases 
                                               
1
 For a comprehensive consideration of EU freedoms, TERRA-WATTEL, European Tax Law, 2005, pp. 38 ss. 
2
 In this respect, Costa v ENEL (ECJ 15 July 1964, 6/64). 
3
 The “national treatment” principle is expressed in paragraph 94 of De Groot (ECJ 12 December 2002, C-
385/00), where the ECJ held that “Member States must (…) respect the principle of national treatment of 
nationals of other Member States and of their own nationals who exercise the freedoms guaranteed by the 
Treaty” (emphasis added). 
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as such will be referred to as “host-State” cases (e.g. Avoir fiscal4, Schumacker5, 
Wielockx6, Futura7, Saint-Gobain8, and Truck Center9); it is also possible that rules laid 
down by a MS restrict its own nationals from exercising the freedoms in other MSs: 
these cases will be referred to as “origin-State” cases (e.g. Daily Mail10, Lenz11, 
Manninen12, Marks & Spencer13, FII114, and X Holding15).16 
While discrimination on the grounds of nationality (direct discrimination) is 
never admitted, unless justified by reasons provided for by the TFEU (e.g. public 
policy, public security, and public health in Art. 45, par. 3, TFEU), a different 
situation features when: (i) a discrimination which is not grounded on nationality, 
but on different criteria mainly affecting nationals of other MSs (indirect 
discrimination), occurs (e.g. Sotgiu17, Biehl18, and Commerzbank19); (ii) a restriction 
occurs, i.e. a rule hinders or deters the exercise of freedom rights (e.g. Gebhard20 and 
Futura, from a host-State perspective; Lenz, from an origin-State case). 
However, in all situations of discrimination and restriction, the condition for MSs 
to grant – and for EU nationals to receive21 – national treatment is that there must be 
comparability between the situations of the EU national who exercised the freedom 
and the EU national who did not, the latter possibly being a national of a different 
                                               
4
 ECJ 28 January 1986, Case 270/83. 
5
 ECJ 14 February 1995, C-279/93. 
6
 ECJ 11 August 1995, C-80/94. 
7
 ECJ 15 May 1997, C-250/95. 
8
 ECJ 21 September 1999, C-307/97. 
9
 ECJ 22 December 2008, C-282/07. 
10
 ECJ 27 September 1988, Case 81/87. 
11
 ECJ 15 July 2004, C-315/02. 
12
 ECJ 7 September 2004, C-319/02. 
13
 ECJ 13 December 2005, C-446/03. 
14
 ECJ 12 December 2006, C-446/04. 
15
 ECJ 25 February 2010, C-337/08. 
16
 The classification of “host-State” and “origin-State” cases has been developed by and is explained in O’SHEA, 
EU Tax Law and Double Tax Conventions, 2008, pp. 34-42; ID., European Tax Controversies: A British-Dutch 
Debate: Back to Basics and Is the ECJ Consistent?, in World Tax Journal, February 2013, pp. 119-121. 
17
 ECJ 12 February 1974, Case 152/73, where for the first time the ECJ stated that “[t]he rules regarding equality 
of treatment (…) forbid not only overt discrimination by reason of nationality but also all covert forms of 
discrimination which, by the application of other criteria of differentiation, lead in fact to the same result” 
(Sotgiu, 11). 
18
 ECJ 8 May 1990, C-175/88. 
19
 ECJ 13 July 1993, C-330/91. 
20
 ECJ 30 November 1995, C-55/94. 
21
 Subject to the condition that different treatment is not justified, and – if so – disproportionate. Justifications 
and proportionality are out of the scope of this research. 
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MS (host-MS) or of the same MS (origin-MS)22: comparability of the migrant, who 
exercised the freedoms, and the non-migrant, who did not, is thus a key-concept 
from both host-State and origin-State perspectives.23 
 
3. COMPARABILITY IN THE “HOST-STATE” ENVIRONMENT 
In the direct tax area, the ECJ first affirmed comparability in two landmark 
decisions: Avoir fiscal24, concerning different treatment depending upon the MS 
where insurance companies had established their registered seat, and Schumacker, 
regarding different tax treatment of a non-resident worker. 
 
3.1. AVOIR FISCAL 
In Avoir fiscal, the ECJ dealt with French rules which applied “disparity in the 
treatment in regard to the shareholders’ tax credit”25 (in French, “avoir fiscal”) of 
insurance companies whose registered seat was in France vis-à-vis insurance 
companies having branches in France and their registered seat in other MSs. The case 
sprang from an infringement action brought by the Commission, pursuant to current 
Art. 258 TFEU26, for the purposes of the freedom of establishment, and revolved 
around comparability of French companies and foreign companies with branches in 
France. 
                                               
22
 An analytical tool of analysis of the national treatment test is the “migrant/non-migrant test”, where the 
situation of a national who exercised the freedom right (i.e. “the migrant”), and the national who did not (i.e. 
“the non-migrant”) are to be compared (see O’SHEA, EU Tax Law, p. 42). 
23
 Importance of comparability from both perspectives is stressed by O’SHEA, National Treatment, at 
www.ccls.qmul.ac.uk/docs/staff/oshea/52207.pdf (last visited 22 August, 2013), pp. 6-7. 
24
 Avoir fiscal is commonly considered to be ECJ’s first tax case. Nevertheless, ECJ’s first tax case is Humblet 
(ECJ 16 December 1960, Case 6/60), a competence case dealing with the taxation of the salary of a ECSC 
official. Belgium, Mr Humbet’s State of residence, applied the exemption with progression method, so that the 
salary was indirectly taken into account by taxing domestic income at a higher rate, while the salary had to be 
exempt under ECSC Treaty. The ECJ held that such a rule provided for an indirect taxation of the official’s 
salary and had the same effect of taxing it directly. On this case, O’SHEA, Freedom of establishment tax 
jurisprudence: Avoir fiscal re-visited, in EC Tax Review, 2008-6, pp. 260-261. 
25
 Avoir fiscal, 10. 
26
 ECJ cases may derive either from: 
- an action of the Commission (“infringement cases”), which deems that a MS failed to fulfill an 
obligation provided for by the TFEU or the Treaty of European Union (“TEU”); 
- the request from a domestic judge (“preliminary ruling cases”): under Art. 267 TFEU, the ECJ shall 
have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings on the interpretation of the TFEU and TEU, and on the 
validity of the acts of EU institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the EU, upon request of a tribunal 
or a court of a MS. 
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According to the Commission, French rules did “discriminate against branches 
(…) in France of insurance companies whose registered office is in another MS by 
comparison with companies whose registered office is in France.”27 
The French Government, in replying, sought to demonstrate that the disparity 
questioned by the Commission was justified by objective differences between 
resident and non-resident insurance companies, “an essential distinction in tax law 
(...) also applicable in the context of Article 52 of the Treaty.”28 
At the outset, the ECJ noted that, for companies, the registered office “serves as 
the connecting factor with the legal system of a particular state, like nationality in the 
case of natural persons”29, and accepting that a host-MS “may freely apply (…) a 
different treatment solely by reason of the (…) registered office (…) in another 
Member State would thus deprive that provision of all meaning.”30 
Then, the ECJ, in setting the comparability between French and foreign 
companies, held that the French tax system did not distinguish between French 
companies and foreign companies with a branch in France, for the purpose of 
determining taxable profits31: in facts, they were both “liable to taxation on profits 
made in undertakings carried on in France, to the exclusion of profits which are 
made abroad.”32 The ECJ concluded that, since the French tax system placed French 
companies and foreign companies with a branch33 “on the same footing for the 
purposes of taxing their profits, those rules cannot, without giving rise to 
discrimination, treat them differently in regard to the grant of an advantage related 
                                               
27
 Avoir fiscal, 11. 
28
 Avoir fiscal, 17. 
29
 Avoir fiscal, 18. 
30
 Avoir fiscal, 18. 
31
 Conversely, for a full equation of national companies and permanent establishments, and no distinction 
between direct and indirect discrimination, SCHÖN, The Free Choice between the Right to Establish a Branch 
and to Set-up a Subsidiary - a Principle of European Business Law, in European Business Organization Law 
Review, 2, 2001, p. 341. 
32
 Avoir fiscal, 19. 
33
 TERRA-WATTEL, European, p. 150, define ECJ’s approach as “economic (…), disregarding legal personality 
by equating branches and subsidiaries.” It is respectfully submitted that the ECJ does not adopt an economic 
approach, as: (i) it was repeatedly stated that, as a rule, residents and non-residents are not comparable; (ii) 
comparison is never made between a resident company and a branch, but between a resident and a non-resident: 
in Avoir fiscal comparability was set because France exempted foreign income of French companies (i.e. also 
French companies were taxed on French-sourced income only) (Avoir fiscal, 19) and placed foreign companies 
on the same footing of national companies when taxing their profits (Avoir fiscal, 20). 
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to taxation.”34 In other words, “both were taxed in the same way – both should have 
received the avoir fiscal in the same way.”35 
Therefore, the disparity in treatment regarding the avoir fiscal amounted to a 
discrimination constituting a restriction of the right of establishment and, as such, 
was prohibited by EU law. France had thus to grant national treatment to foreign 
companies with a branch, as far as the “avoir fiscal” was concerned. 
Avoir fiscal is remarkably significant because, for the first time in the international 
tax law scenario, comparability between national and foreign companies was 
maintained. Furthermore, Avoir fiscal stated principles of law which have been 
widely upheld by the ECJ in subsequent decisions, as it can be showed by taking into 
consideration Schumacker. 
 
3.2. SCHUMACKER 
3.2.1. THE OPINION OF AG LÉGER36 
Schumacker dealt with different treatment of workers on the grounds of residence 
for tax purposes. 
In this respect, AG Léger noted that “[t]he criterion of residence is the main pillar 
of international tax law. Chosen by almost every State in the world, it is given 
precedence over nationality.”37 States usually tax residents on their worldwide 
income (“unlimited taxation”), and non-residents on the income produced within the 
boundaries of the State (“limited taxation”), on the grounds that they are in totally 
different tax situations. This derives from the fact “by choosing to reside in a 
particular State, a person assumes the obligation to contribute to the costs of public 
administration and the public services made available to him by that State. It is 
therefore logical that that State should tax the entirety of his income (…). It is also 
                                               
34
 Avoir fiscal, 20. 
35
 O’SHEA, Freedom, p. 263. 
36
 AG’s Opinion to Schumacker, delivered on 22 November 1994. 
37
 AG’s Opinion to Schumacker, 35, and with the relevant exception of the United States, which taxes US 
citizens and green card holders on their worldwide income, beside individuals physically present in the country 
according to a “substantial presence” test. For a full summary, MILLER-OATS, Principles of International 
Taxation, 2012, pp. 41-42. 
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that State, where the taxpayer has focused his family life, which will grant him 
allowances and reliefs. There is a personal link between the taxpayer and his State of 
residence.”38 On the contrary, the State of source – i.e. the State of employment, in 
Schumacker – “taxes the non-resident in a quasi objective manner only on his income 
arising in its territory. The taxpayer, indeed, has no other link with that State than the 
economic activity.”39 Absence of link with non-residents usually leads States to apply 
withholding taxes to non-residents, who might seek relief of the (potential) double 
taxation through Double Tax Treaties (hereafter “DTT”), if available, or domestic 
unilateral provisions. 
From this analysis is clear that a distinction between a resident and a non-resident 
occurs “because they are not, objectively, in the same situation.”40 
This statement, however, must be considered in light of two aspects, namely the 
potential (indirect) discrimination arising from a different treatment on the grounds 
of tax residence, and whether comparability of residents and non-residents may be 
established. 
On the first aspect, the ECJ had highlighted that also provisions which do not 
constitute discrimination on the grounds of nationality may “be tantamount, as 
regards their practical effect, to discrimination on the grounds of nationality.”41 In 
these circumstances, the ECJ investigates whether the various rules at stake 
constitute indirect discrimination, i.e. ascertains whether the different criterion 
adopted by MSs should be viewed as a distinction on the grounds of nationality. In 
this respect, AG Léger “conceded that the majority of non-residents are non-nationals 
and that a benefit reserved exclusively for residents conceals discrimination based on 
nationality.”42 
                                               
38
 AG’s Opinion to Schumacker, 36. 
39
 AG’s Opinion to Schumacker, 37. 
40
 AG’s Opinion to Schumacker, 38. 
41
 Sotgiu, 11; see also Biehl, 14, and Commerzbank, 15. 
42
 AG’s Opinion to Schumacker, 51. 
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This leads to consider the second aspect43, given that – as the ECJ also made it 
clear – discrimination, being it direct or indirect, only “arises through the application 
of different rules to comparable situations or the application of the same rule to 
different situations.”44 In order to ascertain whether comparable situations occurred, 
AG Léger analyzed the facts of Schumacker. 
Mr Schumacker, national of and resident in Belgium, was a frontier worker 
employed in Germany, who earned almost all of his income from his employment, 
having no or almost no income in his State of residence. Germany denied him the 
“splitting”, a tax advantage available to resident married couples, because he was not 
tax resident in Germany. On the other hand, Belgium could not take into account Mr 
Schumacker’s personal circumstances because (i) there was no income from that 
State, and (ii) Belgium applied the exemption method in the DTT concluded with 
Germany. Mr Schumacker, then, could not have his personal and family 
circumstances taken into account in either State: Belgium exempted his income, and 
could not grant any personal deduction; Germany did not grant the “splitting” 
facility to non-residents, because personal and family circumstances are to be 
considered by the State of residence. 
In general terms, the approach of an objective taxation of non-residents by the 
State of source allows to avoid the granting of a double benefit (i.e. deductions for 
personal circumstances in both States), with the State of residence in a privileged 
position at assessing the ability to pay of its residents. 
However, this system displayed “a weakness where the non-resident taxpayer 
receives all (or almost all) his income in his State of employment and (…) such 
income is taxable only in the latter State.”45 Consequently, comparability between 
residents and Mr Schumacker was affirmed: they were “for tax purposes in the same 
                                               
43
 In respect of which AG Léger asked whether “an objective difference of circumstances which could justify 
different treatment” occurred (AG’s Opinion to Schumacker, 57). 
44
 Wielockx, 17. 
45
 AG’s Opinion to Schumacker, 65. 
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situation”46, because “the non-resident receives all his income in his State of 
employment.”47 The non-resident, though, had still “to pay tax on the income 
received in his State of employment without his personal circumstances and his 
family responsibilities being taken into consideration.”48 
AG Léger concluded that German rules which applied different treatment, 
depending upon tax residence, constituted indirect discrimination prohibited by EU 
law. 
 
3.2.2. ECJ’S DECISION 
The ECJ delivered the judgment in Schumacker along the lines of Léger’s Opinion. 
For what concerns indirect discrimination, the ECJ confirmed that rules such as 
the ones at stake, although applicable irrespective of taxpayers’ nationality, were 
“liable to operate mainly to the detriment of nationals of other Member States. Non-
residents are in the majority of cases foreigners.”49 Accordingly, tax advantages 
granted only to residents for tax purposes may “constitute indirect discrimination by 
reason of nationality.”50 
However, a discrimination arises only to the extent that different rules apply to 
comparable situation, or the same rules apply to different situations51, and, in this 
respect, “the situations of residents and of non-residents are not, as a rule, 
comparable”52: therefore, denying to non-residents tax advantages available to 
residents “is not, as a rule, discriminatory.”53 
Most importantly, the ECJ stated that freedom of movement for workers does not 
always prevent MSs from taxing non-resident workers more heavily than resident 
                                               
46
 AG’s Opinion to Schumacker, 68. 
47
 AG’s Opinion to Schumacker, 75. 
48
 AG’s Opinion to Schumacker, 70. 
49
 Schumacker, 28. 
50
 Schumacker, 29. 
51
 Schumacker, 30. 
52
 Schumacker, 31. 
53
 Schumacker, 34. 
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workers54: MSs are precluded to do so, only if the non-resident worker is in a 
comparable situation to resident workers, i.e. when “the non-resident receives no 
significant income in the State of his residence (…), [which] is not in a position to 
grant him the benefits resulting from taking into account of his personal and family 
circumstances.”55 In a situation as such, the ECJ concluded that “there is no objective 
difference”56 between a non-resident and a resident who performs a comparable 
employment. 
The outcome of Schumacker, according to which – at certain conditions – residents 
and non-residents are in a comparable situation, is a keystone of ECJ’s jurisprudence, 
as proved for instance in D.57 Such principle is even more distinct if contrasted with 
Gschwind.58 
 
3.3. GSCHWIND (VS. SCHUMACKER) 
Mr Gschwind, a Dutch national, was a frontier-worker employed in Germany. He 
lived in the Netherlands with his wife, where she was employed. In the relevant 
years (1991 and 1992), Mr Gschwind had earnings equal to 58% of the household’s 
aggregate income, which – according to the relevant Germany-Netherlands DTT – 
was taxable in Germany; however, the Netherlands were entitled “to include in the 
tax base income taxable in Germany, whilst deducting from the tax so calculated the 
part of it corresponding to the taxable income in Germany.”59 Mrs Gschwind’s 
income, equal to 42% of the household’s aggregate income, was taxable in the 
Netherlands. Under German rules introduced in 1995 (after Schumacker and 
Wielockx), German tax authorities assessed Mr Gschwind “as a person subject to 
                                               
54
 Schumacker, 35. 
55
 Schumacker, 36. 
56
 Schumacker, 37. 
57
 ECJ 5 July 2005, C-376/03, where the ECJ, recalling Schumacker, held that “a taxpayer who holds only a 
minor part of his wealth in a Member State other than the State where he is resident is not, as a rule, (…) 
comparable to (…) residents of that other Member State” (D., 38). On D.’s relations with Schumacker and the 
earlier Matteucci (ECJ 27 September 1988, C-235/87), O’SHEA, The ECJ, the ‘D’ case, double tax conventions 
and most-favoured nations: comparability and reciprocity, in EC Tax Review, 2005-4, pp. 192-194; 195. 
58
 ECJ 14 September 1999, C-391/97. 
59
 Gschwind, 10. 
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unlimited taxation but treated him as if he were a single.”60 He was in facts denied 
“splitting” tax relief, on the grounds that such a relief was available only if his spouse 
had an income equal to less than 10% of the household’s aggregate income or lower 
than a certain threshold (DEM 24.000): Mrs Gschwind’s income exceeded both 
thresholds. 
The ECJ dealt with the question whether EU law precluded provisions such as the 
German ones, which granted the “splitting” to non-resident couples, but only subject 
to the condition that the household’s income arising outside Germany was below 
certain thresholds. 
The ECJ, after recalling the conditions laid down in Schumacker for comparability 
of residents and non-residents, stressed that such comparability did not occur in 
Gschwind, where the situation was “clearly different from (…) Schumacker (…). Mr 
Schumacker’s income formed almost the entire income of his tax household and 
neither he nor his spouse had any significant income in their State of residence 
allowing account to be taken of their personal and family circumstances.”61 Unlike 
Schumacker, a significant part (42%) of the total household’s income of Mr and Mrs 
Gschwind arose in their State of residence: this means that – potentially, at least – 
“that State is in a position to take into account Mr Gschwind’s personal and family 
circumstances”62, “owing to the existence of a sufficient tax base in the State of 
residence.”63 
The literature has correctly highlighted that “the reasoning in the decision is that 
the residence state is in a position to take family circumstances into account, not that 
it actually does so.”64 As Mr Schumacker, Mr Gschwind was not granted any 
                                               
60
 Gschwind, 11. 
61
 Gschwind, 28. 
62
 Gschwind, 29. 
63
 Gschwind, 30. This conclusion was upheld in the later Wallentin (ECJ 1 July 2004, C-169/03), whose outcome 
was that the State of source (Sweden) had to grant to the non-resident (Mr Wallentin) allowances available only 
to residents, even though the non-resident had income in his State of residence (Germany); however, such 
income was not taxable according to the German tax system. Wallentin can be explained by using the words of 
Gschwind: Sweden had to grant the allowances, since there was “no sufficient tax base” in Germany, whereas 
not taxable income is not included in the tax base. 
64
 AVERY JONES, What is the difference between Schumacker and Gschwind?, in British Tax Review, 2000, 4, p. 
195. 
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personal allowance, because his State of residence did not  take his “circumstances 
into account, either in taxing him, because his income was exempt, or in taxing his 
wife, because allowances are transferable only if the transferor has no income, and he 
did have some income although it was exempt.”65 In light of these facts, this 
literature reaches the conclusion that “if, as in Schumacker, the income taxable in the 
residence state is too low for there to be any allowances there, the source state must 
give the allowances”66; on the contrary, if the spouse’s income is enough to benefit 
from allowances in the State of residence, as in Gschwind, the source State is not 
obliged to grant national treatment, even though the State of residence does not 
actually accord personal allowances.67 
In conclusion, there is no title for EU nationals to the better treatment between the 
State of residence (origin-State) and the State of employment (host-State), a potential 
disadvantage deriving from lack of harmonization: the employee is entitled to host-
MS’s national treatment as long as he is comparable to residents of the host-State (as 
in Schumacker). If no comparability can be set, (i) the employee will only benefit from 
the tax advantages of his State of residence, as long as the conditions laid down by 
the tax system of the State of residence are fulfilled (which did not happen in 
Gschwind), and (ii) the State of employment is not required to grant national 
treatment, and can tax non-resident workers more heavily than residents.68 
 
3.4. FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF COMPARABILITY: ASSCHER AND GERRITSE  
Gschwind allows to highlight a landmark aspect of comparability analysis, namely 
that the judgment was delivered in relation to “the application of tax provisions such 
as those in question.”69 This means that comparability analysis must be run while 
                                               
65
 AVERY JONES, What is, p. 195. 
66
 AVERY JONES, What is, p. 197. 
67
 Also O’SHEA, EU Tax Law, p. 52, stressed that Gschwind can be distinguished from Schumacker on the 
grounds that “the residence State could take into account the personal and family circumstances of the Gschwind 
family because the “tax base” is sufficient there to enable them to be taken into account.” 
68
 As expressly stated in Schumacker, 35. 
69
 Gschwind, 30. 
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taking into consideration the aim pursued by the relevant provisions (i.e. teleological 
interpretation).70 
This objective-oriented approach is essential in order to set the range of 
comparability: this is proved by contrasting Gschwind with the earlier Asscher71 and 
the later Gerritse72, in which the migrants were entitled to national treatment, even 
though their income in the host-State was lower than 90%. 
Mr Asscher (a Belgian resident, exercising freedom of establishment in the 
Netherlands, as self-employed) and Mr Gerritse (a Dutch resident, exercising 
freedom to provide services in Germany), as non-residents for tax purposes, suffered 
a higher taxation than residents. In particular, according to the Dutch tax system, Mr 
Asscher suffered higher taxation than residents in the first tax-bracket (25% 
compared to 13%).73 Similarly, under the applicable German rules, Mr Gerritse was 
taxed on his German-sourced income through a final 25% deduction at source on 
gross income, while income arising in the hands of residents was taxable on a net 
basis, according to a progressive table, under which an exemption was also granted 
up to a certain threshold.74 
Both host-States’ tax systems provided for an optional regime, according to which 
non-residents could opt for being taxed as residents, provided that 90% of their 
income was sourced within the host-State, or – only in Gerritse – income arisen 
outside the host-State was below a fixed threshold.75 Neither Mr Asscher, nor Mr 
Gerritse met these requirements (i.e. they were not in a Schumacker-like situation), 
and were thus treated less favorably than residents. On these grounds, Messrs 
Asscher and Gerritse claimed that they were indirectly discriminated.76 
                                               
70
 As noted by O’SHEA, European Tax Controversies – Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?, in The EC Tax Journal, 
vol. 12, 2011-12, p. 54. On teleological interpretation adopted by the ECJ, also having regard to TFEU-TEU 
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In Asscher, the Netherlands Government held that the provisions at stake were 
grounded on the fact that the higher rate prevented “that certain non-residents 
escape the progressive nature of the tax because their tax obligations are confined to 
income received in the Netherlands.”77 Analogously, in Gerritse, the German tax 
authority argued that, “if the basic tax table were to be applied without restriction, 
(…) Mr Gerritse would escape the progressive element of that tax, even though his 
worldwide income required the application of a higher rate.”78 
The ECJ observed that – since the DTTs concluded by the Netherlands with 
Belgium (Asscher) and Germany (Gerritse) provided for the exemption with 
progression method for relieving double taxation – Belgium and the Netherlands did 
apply progressivity in taxing, respectively, Messrs Asscher79 and Gerritse.80 
Accordingly, the ECJ replied to the Dutch Government’s argument that “the fact 
that a taxpayer is a non-resident (…) does not enable him, in the circumstances under 
consideration, to escape the application of the rule of progressivity”81: therefore, Mr 
Asscher was deemed to be comparable to residents. Similarly, in Gerritse, the ECJ also 
affirmed the comparability of residents and non-residents, because progressivity did 
apply in the Netherlands, according to the relevant DTT.82 In addition, for what 
concerns the domestic rules which did not authorize the deductibility of business 
expenses incurred by non-residents, the ECJ held that “the business expenses in 
question are directly linked to the activity that generated the taxable income in 
Germany, so that residents and non-residents are placed in a comparable situation in 
that respect.”83 
One may now ask why Mr Gschwind was not found to be comparable to 
residents, while Messrs Asscher and Gerritse were deemed comparable to residents, 
neither one of the latter two taxpayers being in a Schumacker-like situation. 
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In order to reconcile these three cases, it is of capital importance to stress that 
comparability analysis was run having regard to “the circumstances under 
consideration”84 in Asscher, and to the direct link between business expenses and 
profits85, and “to the progressivity rule” in Gerritse.86 
In other words, comparability was set having regard to the aim pursued by 
domestic provisions, i.e. preventing non-residents from escaping progressivity, 
which did not happen in the facts at stake, and allowing the deduction of expenses 
directly linked to the production of taxable income. This reasoning, but with opposite 
conclusion, was applied in Gschwind: no comparability was found because the State 
of residence was already in the position to take into account personal and family 
circumstances, and – having regard to the objective of the provisions granting 
personal and family allowances – Mr Gschwind was not comparable to residents of 
the host-State. 
 
3.5. NATIONAL TREATMENT AND THE INTERACTION OF DTTS WITH DOMESTIC 
PROVISIONS 
In Avoir fiscal, Schumacker, Gschwind, Asscher, and Gerritse, domestic provisions 
laid down by the host-MSs were deemed to be incompatible with EU law; rules set 
by the DTTs were considered only to the extent of defining the liability of the 
taxpayers and which method of relief was applicable. 
The ECJ brought its comparability analysis a step forward when had to judge 
whether DTTs provisions, granting rights to residents of contracting States87, may 
interact with domestic provisions and contribute to setting the national treatment. 
The ECJ dealt with the interaction between domestic rules and rights accorded by 
DTTs in Saint-Gobain. 
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3.5.1. SAINT-GOBAIN 
Compagnie de Saint-Gobain S.A. (hereafter “Saint-Gobain SA”) was a French 
company, with a German branch (Saint-Gobain ZN). Saint-Gobain SA held through 
Saint-Gobain ZN shares of a number of companies whose registered seats were in 
Germany, Switzerland, and United States. 
Companies subject to unlimited taxation in Germany benefitted in the relevant 
fiscal year (1988) from various tax advantages, some of them being available under 
DTTs Germany entered into with non-MSs (United States and Switzerland)88, while 
non-resident companies with branches, subject to limited taxation, were precluded 
from enjoying such tax advantages, on the grounds that they were not liable to tax in 
Germany on their worldwide income. 
Saint-Gobain SA, as subject to limited taxation in Germany, was denied the tax 
advantages available to residents, and questioned such denial on the grounds of 
incompatibility with EU law. The case went before the German Finanzgericht which 
asked the ECJ whether freedom of establishment prohibited provisions, as the 
German ones, which placed Saint-Gobain SA and its branch in less favorable position 
than companies subject to unlimited taxation. 
The ECJ at the outset affirmed that freedom of establishment can be exercised 
either through a subsidiary, a branch, or an agency89, and repeated the principle of 
Avoir fiscal according to which registered seat works for companies as connecting 
factor, “like nationality for natural persons.”90 Then the ECJ explained that, under 
German tax law, companies subject to unlimited taxation are “companies considered 
to be resident in Germany for tax purposes, that is to say companies”91 with 
                                               
88
 In particular, as summarized in Saint-Gobain, 32: 
- an exemption from corporate tax on dividends received by companies resident in non-MSs, provided for by 
the DTTs entered into with such non-MSs; 
- a foreign tax credit, against German corporate tax, for corporate tax paid by the subsidiaries established 
abroad, provided for by German law; 
- an exemption from capital tax for the shares held in companies with registered seat located in non-MSs, 
provided for by German law. 
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registered seat in Germany. By means of this clarification, the ECJ introduced the 
key-concept of the decision, namely the comparability of resident companies and 
non-resident companies with German branches, for what concerns dividends and 
shareholdings taxation. 
The German Government put forward that non-resident companies “are in a 
situation which is objectively different from that of companies resident in 
Germany”92, given the unlimited taxation of the latter vis-à-vis limited taxation of the 
former. 
The ECJ, in response of this argument, narrowed the field of comparability, as in 
paragraph 35 of Gschwind93, and said that, unlike what the German Government 
maintained, “as regards liability to tax on dividends (…) in Germany from shares in 
foreign subsidiaries (…), companies not resident in Germany having a permanent 
establishment there and companies resident in Germany are in objectively 
comparable situations.”94 As a matter of facts, dividends (for the purposes of 
corporate tax) and shareholdings (for the purposes of capital tax) were taxable 
irrespective of the residence of the shareholder, while “difference in treatment 
applied only to the tax concessions.”95 Comparability was even greater in light of the 
fact that denying the tax advantages in question to non-resident companies with 
branches in Germany determined “that their tax liability , theoretically limited to 
‘national’ income and assets, comprises (…) dividends from foreign sources and 
shareholdings in foreign companies limited by shares.”96 Therefore, the ECJ set that 
non-resident companies with German branches, having regard to dividends taxation, 
were in a comparable situation to resident companies. 
The ECJ then rejected all the justifications put forward by MSs’ Governments, 
namely that (i) “[t]o extend to other situations the tax advantages provided for by 
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treaties concluded with non-member countries would not be compatible with the 
division of competences under Community law”97; and (ii) the principle of 
reciprocity DTTs are based on would be violated “if the benefit (…) was extended to 
companies established in Member States which were not parties of them.”98 
In respect of these observations, the ECJ importantly highlighted what role DTTs 
play within the EU framework.99 
The ECJ agreed that MSs retain the competence of allocating powers of taxation 
between themselves, by means of DTTs, in respect of which MSs are free100, but, “[a]s 
far as the exercise of the power of taxation so allocated is concerned, the Member 
States (…) may not disregard Community rules [because,] although direct taxation is 
a matter for the Member States, they must nevertheless exercise their taxation powers 
consistently with Community law.”101 As a consequence, having regard to DTTs 
entered into by a MS and non-MSs, “the national treatment principle requires the 
Member State which is party to the treaty to grant to permanent establishments of 
non-resident companies the advantages provided for by that treaty on the same 
conditions as those which apply to resident companies.”102 
This, however, does not mean that a non-resident company is entitled to the 
rights granted by a DTT concluded for the benefit of residents of the Contracting 
States. On the contrary, it was for Germany – through a unilateral extension – to 
grant the national treatment, so that neither balance nor reciprocity of DTTs “would 
(…) be called into question (…) since such an extension would not (…) affect the 
rights of the non-member countries (...) parties of the treaties and would not impose 
any new obligation on them.”103 
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In conclusion, in Saint-Gobain (and in the later Gottardo) the ECJ pointed out that 
also rights granted by DTTs (and international agreements) to residents (or nationals) 
fall within the scope of the national treatment, if residents and non-residents 
(nationals and non-nationals) are in objectively comparable situations. 
However, Saint-Gobain had not showed the complete picture of the interaction of 
DTTs and domestic provisions104, which was further brought into focus by 
Bouanich.105 
 
3.5.2. BOUANICH 
Ms Bouanich, a French resident, held shares in a Swedish public limited 
company, which made payments to Ms Bouanich in 1998, in connection with a 
reduction in its share capital. 
The Swedish tax regime in the relevant year distinguished between resident and 
non-resident shareholders who received such payments. The amount received by 
resident shareholders was taxed at 30% tax-rate as capital gain, and the acquisition 
cost of the repurchased shares could be deducted. On the contrary, the sum paid to 
non-resident shareholders was considered as a dividend, taxed at 30% tax-rate, and 
no deduction of the acquisition cost was available. 
Nevertheless, if a DTT were in place, different rules would apply. 
The relevant DTT, entered into by France and Sweden, provided for that 
dividends may be taxed by the source-State by means of a withholding tax not 
exceeding 15% of the gross amount. In addition, if the payments were connected to a 
reduction of the share capital, “an amount corresponding to the nominal value of the 
repurchased shares”106 could be deducted.107 
Under these provisions, Sweden levied a 15% withholding tax on the whole 
amount of the payments. Ms Bouanich sought refund of the whole amount and, 
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alternatively, of the amount corresponding to the nominal value of repurchased 
shares. The Swedish tax office accepted the alternative refund, but rejected the main 
refund claim. This latter denial was appealed, and the ECJ was asked whether: (i) the 
preclusion to deduct acquisition cost on the grounds of the shareholder’s foreign 
residence, while resident shareholders were allowed to do so, was compatible with 
free movement of capital rights; (ii) the same provisions which banned the deduction 
of acquisition cost to non-resident shareholders are compatible with free movement 
of capital rights when a DTT provided for the deduction of the nominal value of the 
shares. 
In response to the first question, the ECJ stated that the relevant rules provided 
for a tax advantage (i.e. deduction of acquisition cost), available to resident and not to 
non-resident shareholders: therefore, such regime constituted a restriction on the 
freedom of establishment.108 In addition, the ECJ held that, in order to be compatible 
with EU law, such rules had to be justified, and that it was then necessary to verify 
“whether the different tax treatment of income (…) relates to situations which are not 
objectively comparable.”109 
In setting the comparability, the ECJ held that acquisition cost was “directly 
linked to the payment made on the occasion of a share repurchase so that, in this 
regard110, residents and non-residents are in a comparable situation. There is no 
objective difference (…) such as to justify different treatment (…).”111 
Having regard to the second question, the ECJ premised that, since France-
Sweden DTT “forms part of the legal background to the main proceedings (…), the 
Court of Justice must take it into account in order to give an interpretation of 
Community law that is relevant to the national court.”112 Therefore, in order to 
answer to the question sub (ii), the ECJ pointed out that it is necessary to ascertain 
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whether resident shareholders were “treated more favourably than non-resident 
shareholders”113, and this depended upon the figures of acquisition cost and nominal 
value. From this flows that the relevant DTT – which fixed a lower taxation on 
dividends, compared to domestic rules – may remove “the restriction on 
fundamental freedom that has been found to exist”114 at the domestic level sub (i). 
For this reason, the ECJ held that the national legislation resulting from domestic 
provisions and the DTT’s rules was incompatible with EU law, “except where, under 
such national legislation, non-resident shareholders are not treated less favourably 
than resident shareholders.”115 
The outcome of Bouanich is extremely important for two reasons. 
First, the ECJ made it clear that a DTT may heal restrictions provided for by 
domestic provisions, in principle, prohibited by EU law: this would be the case, if the 
tax paid according to the 15% tax-rate on the repurchase price, deducted the nominal 
value of shares, were equal to the tax paid under the domestic rules, i.e. the national 
treatment (30% tax-rate on the repurchase price, deducted the acquisition cost). 
Secondly, from Bouanich flows that while EU law precludes MSs from treating 
residents more favorably than non-residents in comparable situations, EU law does 
not require identical treatment: as a matter of facts, EU law provides for “no less 
favourable treatment”, and, as a result of the interaction of domestic and DTT rules, 
the ECJ cleared that non-residents can be treated more favorably than resident.116 
 
3.6. LOOKING AT SCHUMACKER AND SAINT-GOBAIN IN LIGHT OF BOUANICH 
From Saint-Gobain and Gottardo derives that the position which residents gain by 
means of DTTs concluded by their MS of residence sets the standard of national 
treatment. In addition, Bouanich brought along that a DTT may heal domestic 
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regimes which place resident in a more favorable position than comparable non-
residents. 
The outcomes of these decisions allow to better define comparability analysis, in 
particular, by means of hypothesizing slightly different circumstances of Schumacker 
and Saint-Gobain. 
In Schumacker, Mr Schumacker was held in an objectively comparable situation to 
resident workers, because he earned almost all of his income in the host-MS 
(Germany). He had no personal circumstances taken into account there, nor in the 
MS of residence (Belgium). This was also the consequence of the fact that Belgium 
applied the exemption method in the relevant DTT entered into with Germany. 
The question now is whether Schumacker would have had a different outcome, if 
Belgium had applied the credit method in the DTT with Germany: in order to answer 
to this question, it is necessary to consider whether Mr Schumacker would still be 
comparable to a resident worker. 
If Belgium had applied the credit method, it would have taxed Mr Schumacker’s  
employment income, and the tax paid in the host-State would have been credited 
against the tax levied by Belgium. It is very likely that, in this situation, the overall 
tax base would have been sufficient for personal and family circumstances to be 
taken into consideration by the MS of residence. 
Therefore, it is argued that a DTT applying the credit method would have healed 
the disparity of treatment between Mr Schumacker and resident workers, allowing 
sufficient tax base in the MS of residence. 
A similar reasoning can be applied to Saint-Gobain, where a French company with 
a German branch claimed that should have received the (national) treatment in 
respect of some advantages granted to resident companies through DTTs concluded 
between Germany and non-MSs (Switzerland and United States). 
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Under the OECD MTC117, permanent establishments of non-resident companies 
qualify for the rights granted by the DTTs entered into by the State of their head-
office (i.e. State of residence). In the case of Saint-Gobain SA, the relevant DTTs were 
the ones entered into by France with Switzerland and with the United States. 
According to the principles contained in Bouanich, even though domestic 
provisions may have treated the French company with a branch in Germany less 
favorably than companies resident in Germany for the purposes of dividends 
taxation, the relevant DTTs may have had the effect of removing the restrictions on 
EU freedoms which existed according to the purely domestic scenario. 
 
3.7. DIFFERENT TREATMENT OF INTEREST PAYMENTS, BASED ON THE RESIDENCE OF 
THE RECIPIENTS: TRUCK CENTER (AS A FOLLOW-UP OF ACT IV GLO) 
In considering comparability analysis in ECJ’s cases, a very significant one is 
Truck Center, which dealt with the taxation of interests paid out by companies 
resident in Belgium. 
According to the relevant Belgian rules, the payment of interests by a Belgian 
company to another Belgian company was exempt from withholding tax, while 
interest paid by a resident company to a non-resident company was subject to 
withholding tax. 
Truck Center SA (hereafter “Truck Center”), a Belgian company, paid 
withholding-free interests to SA Wickler Finances, a Luxembourg company, holding 
48% of the shares of Truck Center. The Belgian tax administration claimed that the 
withholding tax on such payments was due; the taxpayer opposed that the disparity 
in treatment of interest payments to residents and non-residents was contrary to EU 
law. 
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The case was brought before the Tribunal de première instance d’Arlon, which 
ruled in favor of Truck Center118; this latter decision was appealed before the Cour 
d’appel de Liège, which referred to the ECJ the question whether the relevant Belgian 
provisions “preclude a legislation (…) which provides for the retention of tax at 
source on interest paid by a (…) resident (…) to a recipient company resident in 
another Member State, while exempting from that retention interest paid to a (…) 
resident”119 company. 
The ECJ took the view that a tax regime as such may give rise to a discrimination 
“based on the place in which companies have their seat”120, as well as to a restriction, 
by reason of the heavier taxation.121 Coherently, the ECJ ran both the discrimination 
and the restriction analysis. Beginning from the former122, the ECJ ascertained 
whether residents and non-residents were comparable, given that, according to 
settled case law, “a lack of comparability alone may justify the different treatment of 
the non-resident to the resident.”123 
In respect of companies receiving interest payments, the ECJ found that “the 
difference in treatment (…) consisting in the application of different taxation 
arrangements to companies established in Belgium to those established in another 
Member State, relates to situations which are not objectively comparable”124 for a 
number of reasons. 
First, if both the paying and recipient companies are resident, Belgium acts as 
State of residence, while, if the payer is resident and the recipient is non-resident, 
Belgium acts in its capacity of State of source.125 Secondly, and partly as a 
consequence of this first observations, the payment of interest to a resident company 
                                               
118 For instance, on the grounds that Belgian law was incompatible with EU free movement of capital (Truck 
Center, 18). The ECJ, given SA Wickler Finances’s 48% shareholding, decided the case on the grounds of 
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119 Truck Center, 21. 
120 Truck Center, 32. 
121 Truck Center, 33. 
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is subject to different tax charges than the payment of interest to a non-resident: 
while in the scenario of payments from a resident to a resident, interest payments are 
exempted from the withholding tax, and the income related to such payments is 
taxed in the hands of the recipient company126, payments from a resident to a non-
resident are subjected to withholding, pursuant to the Belgium-Luxembourg DTT.127 
Finally, a resident and a non-resident are in a different position, for what concerns 
the recovery of taxes.128 
Despite some adverse positions in academic literature129, comparability analysis 
run by the ECJ in Truck Center is perfectly in line with the principles affirmed in ACT 
IV GLO130, with the relevant difference that this latter case concerned disparity in 
treatment of dividends paid by resident companies to residents vis-à-vis to non-
residents.131 
In this latter case, according to the relevant British rules, a UK-resident company 
receiving dividends from another UK-resident company was entitled to a tax credit 
for the advance corporation tax (hereafter “ACT”) paid by the distributing company, 
while dividends distributed by a UK-resident company to a non-resident company 
were exempted from tax, unless this latter company was resident of a State which 
had concluded a DTT with the UK, providing for such a tax credit. Only in this latter 
case, non-resident shareholders were also granted the tax credit available to resident 
shareholders.132 
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At the outset, the ECJ cleared that ACT IV GLO was a host-State case (unlike FII1, 
released on the same day, an inbound dividends case from an origin-State 
perspective). 
The ECJ then ran the comparability analysis, and held that no comparability 
could be set on the grounds that, “in most instances, the U.K. was a source state in 
relation to dividends paid cross-border; the dividends received from the U.K. 
company were a U.K. source of income”133; as a consequence, the UK was not 
considered to be “in the same position, as regards the prevention or mitigation of a 
series of charges to tax and of economic double taxation, as the member state in 
which the shareholder receiving the distribution is resident.”134 
As a matter of facts, requiring the source State (i.e. the UK) to ensure that the non-
resident recipient company does not suffer economic double taxation would lead to 
deem that the source State has no taxing power on a “profit generated through an 
economic activity undertaken on its territory.”135 This principle, after all, was not new 
to the ECJ which in Schumacker had already highlighted that the State of residence “is 
best placed to determine the shareholder’s ability to pay tax.”136 
However, for sake of completeness, it must be said that the distinction between a 
resident which is taxed by a MS acting in its capacity of State of residence, and a 
resident taxed by a MS in its capacity of State of source – accepted by the ECJ– has 
been first made by AG Geelhoed in his Opinion to ACT IV GLO137, where he 
maintained that “the concept of discrimination applies in different ways to States 
acting in home State and source State capacity. (…) an economic operator subject to 
home State jurisdiction cannot per se be considered to be in a comparable situation to 
an economic operator subject to source State jurisdiction.”138 
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The impact of this theorization on ACT IV GLO139 is distinct once this latter case is 
contrasted with Bouanich, where the foreign investor was held comparable to a 
domestic one, and no distinction was made with regard to the capacity in which the 
host MS acted in respect of the taxation of dividends paid to a foreign investor. 
The two cases and Truck Center, however, can still be reconciled by bearing in 
mind that, while in Bouanich the host MS subjected the dividends to a series of 
charges (corporate tax and withholding tax under Sweden-France DTT), such series 
of charges did not feature in ACT IV GLO (the host MS levied corporate tax, but no 
withholding on outbound dividends, which were completely exempt), nor in Truck 
Center, where the nature of interest payments implied no series of tax charge, even 
though they were subjected to withholding tax: in facts, interests, unlike dividends, 
are not taxed in the hands of the company by means of corporate tax, but deducted 
as business costs by the paying company. This is confirmed by the ECJ which, in this 
respect, pointed out that, “once a Member State, unilaterally or by a convention, 
imposes a charge to income tax not only on resident shareholders but also on non-
resident shareholders in respect of dividends which they receive from a resident 
company, the position of those non-resident shareholders becomes comparable to 
that of resident shareholders.”140 
Therefore, the distinguishing criterion seems to be whether the dividends are 
subjected to a series of tax charge, namely corporate tax and a tax on dividends: if 
dividends are not subject to a series of tax charge, they are not comparable to 
dividends which are taxed in hands of the company and of the shareholders. This 
never happens, having regard to interests, which are deductible business costs. 
This conclusion seems correct also in light of Denkavit141, where French rules 
provided for a 25% withholding tax on dividends paid to non-resident companies 
and an almost full exemption for domestic dividends. Here, as in Bouanich, and 
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differently from ACT IV GLO, “dividends paid to non-resident parent companies, 
unlike those paid to resident parent companies, are subject to a series of charges to 
tax under French tax legislation.”142 
 
4. COMPARABILITY IN THE “ORIGIN-STATE” ENVIRONMENT 
The decisions which have been considered so far are host-State cases, that can be 
said the natural environment of EU law: as held in Daily Mail, EU law “provisions 
are directed mainly to ensuring that foreign nationals and companies are treated in 
the host Member State in the same way as nationals of that State.”143 
However, as anticipated, EU law applies also to origin-State situations, and cases 
regarding such situations will be considered in this section. 
The ECJ held that EU law provisions “also prohibit the Member State of origin 
from hindering the establishment in another Member State of one of its nationals or 
of a company incorporated under its legislation”144; otherwise, EU freedoms “would 
be rendered meaningless if the Member State of origin could prohibit undertakings 
from leaving in order to establish themselves in another Member State.”145 
Consequently, MSs are not in the position of laying down rules which treat less 
favorably its own nationals who exercise EU freedoms rights vis-à-vis nationals who 
do not exercise such rights. 
However, in order for a national to be entitled to national treatment after having 
operated cross-border, he must be comparable to nationals who operated 
domestically. 
This being premised, from an origin-State perspective, comparability analysis is 
best showed having regard to three groups of cases, i.e. inbound dividend cases, 
interest deduction cases, and loss-relief cases. 
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4.1. INBOUND DIVIDEND CASES: LENZ, MANNINEN, AND FII1 
The first group of origin-State cases concerns the treatment of inbound dividends, 
i.e. received by resident of a MS from companies resident in other MSs. 
In Lenz and Manninen, residents of the same MS were treated differently 
depending upon the residence of the company of which they held shares: in 
particular, in Lenz, Austrian shareholders receiving dividends from companies 
established in other MSs were denied the benefit of a tax-rate reduced by half 
(ordinary taxation applied, with maximum tax-rate of 50%), while dividends from 
Austrian companies were taxed at a 25% tax-rate or lower; in Manninen, a Finnish 
resident who invested in a Swedish company was denied the imputation credit, 
which was available for dividends from resident companies. 
In both cases, MSs of residence maintained that different treatment based upon 
the place of investment did not constitute restriction on the freedoms of 
establishment or of movement of capital, because, first of all, residents who invested 
cross-border were not comparable to residents who invested domestically, being 
cross-border and domestic dividends “fundamentally different in character.”146 The 
MSs involved put forward that in both cases domestic tax legislations were 
“designed to prevent double taxation of company profits by granting to a 
shareholder who receives dividends a tax advantage linked to the taking into 
account of the corporation tax due from the company distributing the dividends.”147 
In setting the comparability between the two residents, one investing cross-border 
and one domestically, the ECJ highlighted that “both revenue from capital of 
Austrian origin and such revenue originating in another Member State are capable of 
being the subject of double taxation”148, because, “[i]n both cases, the revenue is first 
subject to corporation tax and then (…) to income tax in the hands of the 
beneficiaries.”149 In other words, the ECJ held that, if the MS of residence relieves 
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economic double taxation domestically, it will have to relief economic double 
taxation also cross-border, i.e. MSs of residence must grant national treatment. 
In light of this, and for the purposes of the present research, it is important a 
further holding of Manninen, where the ECJ explained that “the situation of persons 
fully taxable in Finland might differ according to the place where they invested their 
capital. That would be the case in particular where the tax legislation of the Member 
State in which the investments were made already eliminated the risk of double 
taxation of company profits distributed in the form of dividends, by, for example, 
subjecting to corporation tax only such profits by the company concerned as were 
not distributed.”150 
The principles of Lenz and Manninen have been later upheld in the answer to the 
first question referred to the ECJ in FII1151, which concerned the treatment of inbound 
dividends, for the purposes of freedom of establishment152 and free movement of 
capital.153 
Pursuant to the relevant British tax system, dividends received by UK companies 
from UK companies were exempt, while dividends received by UK companies from 
companies resident in other MSs were subject to UK corporate tax, but a foreign tax 
credit was granted for the suffered withholding tax, and – provided a minimum 10% 
shareholding by the recipient company – for any underlying tax. 
The taxpayers involved argued that applying an imputation method for 
dividends received from companies resident in other MSs, and the exemption 
method to dividends received from resident companies determined a less favorable 
treatment of the residents which exercised freedom of establishment and free 
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movement of capital, in regard of which the 10% minimum shareholding was also 
questioned. 
In respect of the first issue (i.e. application of two different methods of relief of 
economic double taxation), the ECJ held that, in mitigating a series of charges, MSs 
are in the position to “choose between a number of systems”154: such systems may 
lead to different results, and this is acceptable under EU law. However, this choice 
must comply with the principles of Lenz and Manninen according to which – when a 
series of charges applies, i.e. comparability of the migrant and the non-migrant 
occurs155 – EU freedoms “preclude a Member State from treating foreign-sourced 
dividends less favorably than nationally-sourced dividends.”156 
This means that comparability does not require the MS of residence to provide 
exactly the same treatment. On the contrary, that MS is entitled to treat them 
differently, as far as the migrant is granted national treatment. To this extent, the ECJ 
further cleared that, in a legislation such as the one considered in FII1, national 
treatment is granted “provided that the tax rate applied to foreign-sourced dividends 
is not higher than the rate applied to nationally-sourced dividends and that the tax 
credit”157 given is an ordinary tax credit. 
According to this system, it is possible that, depending upon the circumstances,  
the migrant is worse off than the non-migrant, but this is not a consequence of a less 
favorable treatment applied by the MS of residence, but of lack of harmonization 
and, similarly to Gilly158, “of differences in tax rate”159: as a matter of facts, the 
migrant will suffer a tax disadvantage insofar the MS of the dividend-paying 
company levies more burdensome taxation than the MS of the shareholding 
company. 
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On these grounds, the ECJ held that the UK could treat differently domestic-
sourced and foreign-sourced dividends for the purposes of freedom of 
establishment160 and of free movement of capital161, but nevertheless – for the 
purposes of free movement of capital – had to grant the credit for the underlying tax 
also to shareholders with less than 10% of the share capital.162 Otherwise, if the 
underlying credit were not given, national treatment would not be granted. 
The principles affirmed in the dividend cases are confirmed in the interest 
deduction cases, which will be next analyzed. 
 
4.2. INTEREST DEDUCTION CASES: BOSAL AND KELLER 
Bosal163 and Keller164 are two origin-State cases, concerning the prohibition of 
interest deduction for parent companies, which – directly or indirectly – took up 
loans in order to acquire shares in foreign companies. While Keller can be considered 
a natural follow-up of Bosal, this latter case is of particular importance because it 
represents – to a certain extent – an anticipation of Marks & Spencer. 
Both cases were concerned with the freedom of establishment and the free 
movement of capital: this feature was particularly significant in Keller, because the 
restriction at stake regarded two financial years, and, during the first one (1994), 
Austria had not joined the EC yet, and accordingly only free movement of capital 
applied. 
In Bosal, a Dutch-resident company, having subsidiaries in nine different MSs, 
was refused the deduction of costs borne in connection with the holding in the 
capital of its subsidiaries, because such costs should have been “indirectly 
instrumental in making profits which are taxable”165 in the Netherlands, and the 
profits of the subsidiaries were not taxable there. 
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The Netherlands maintained that such rules were not prohibited by EU law on 
the grounds that “the subsidiaries of parent companies established in the 
Netherlands which do make taxable profits in that Member State and those which do 
not are not in an objectively comparable situation.”166 
In rejecting this argument167, the ECJ cleared that comparing a resident and a non-
resident subsidiary is not correct, while Bosal’s correct comparator is a parent 
company having subsidiaries within the same MS: “The difference in tax treatment 
(…) concerns parent companies according to whether or not they have subsidiaries 
making profits taxable in the Netherlands, even though those parent companies are 
all established in that Member State.”168 By means of this statement, the ECJ cleared 
that a comparison between resident subsidiaries and non-resident subsidiaries is not 
suited for origin-State cases, where parent companies are to be compared.169 
This point must be underlined because shows how comparability analysis 
changes in origin-State cases vis-à-vis host-State cases: in facts, in the former, the 
resident which has exercised EU freedoms must be compared to a resident of the 
same MS which has undertaken the same actions domestically. 
A similar analysis was conducted in Keller, where, under German rules, financing 
costs incurred by a resident parent company in connection with an indirect holding 
in an Austrian subsidiary could not be deducted “to the extent that they relate to 
dividends paid by the latter and redistributed to the parent company under the tax-
free scheme.”170 
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Germany maintained that a parent company with an indirect subsidiary in 
another MS is not comparable to a parent having a subsidiary established in the same 
MS, pointing to the fact that, while “dividends paid by a national indirect subsidiary 
are included in the basis of assessment of the parent company, dividends paid by an 
Austrian indirect subsidiary are exempt from tax”171 in Germany. 
The ECJ rejected this argument and highlighted that the parent investing cross-
border is comparable to a parent investing domestically because, “[i]n both cases, the 
dividends received by the parent company are, in reality, exempt from tax”172, by 
means of an imputation credit available to parent companies.173 Accordingly, as far as 
the relevant tax rules affected only investments in other MSs, non-deductibility could 
not be considered “the corollary of the non-taxable nature of dividends from 
abroad.”174 
From these cases consistently derives that MSs are required to apply national 
treatment to residents which invested cross-border, once they are found to be 
comparable to resident which made similar investment within the MS of origin. This 
is visible also in loss-relief cases. 
 
4.3. LOSS-RELIEF CASES: MARKS & SPENCER AND X HOLDING 
In Marks & Spencer UK group relief rules were considered.175 Marks & Spencer plc 
(hereafter “Marks & Spencer”), a company resident in the UK, was the parent of 
several companies, some of them being resident in the UK, some in other MSs. The 
subsidiaries established in Germany, France and Belgium reported losses, and – 
while Marks & Spencer managed to sell the French subsidiary – the German and 
Belgian ones ceased trading. 
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Marks & Spencer sought relief from the losses incurred by its subsidiaries 
applying to the UK group tax relief, which was denied by the HMRC, “on the 
ground that group relief could only be granted for losses recorded in the United 
Kingdom.”176 
Marks & Spencer appealed against the refusal: while the Special Commissioners 
of Income Tax dismissed the appeal, the High Court of Justice, Chancery Division, 
decided to stay proceeding and referred the question whether the UK provisions 
constituted a restriction, and, if so, whether the restriction could be justified. In 
addition, it was also referred the question whether there may be a difference, in 
answering the first question, if relief had already been granted or obtained in the 
subsidiary’s MS of residence. 
For the purposes of the present research177, it is interesting to note how the ECJ 
dealt with comparability. 
After stating that the UK relevant provisions constituted a restriction, the ECJ 
considered the observation submitted by the United Kingdom, according to which, 
having regard to the group relief system in the proceeding, “resident subsidiaries 
and non-resident subsidiaries are not in comparable tax situations”, in light of the 
principle of territoriality.178 
In rejecting this argument, at the outset the ECJ repeated the reasoning that tax 
residence may justify different treatment, but it is not always a proper factor of 
distinction.179 The ECJ went on by pointing out that “it is necessary to consider 
whether the fact that a tax advantage is available solely to resident taxpayers is based 
on relevant objective elements apt to justify the difference in treatment.”180 In this 
respect, the ECJ cleared that the fact that the MS of residence of the parent does not 
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tax the profits of the subsidiaries, relying on the principle of territoriality, “does not 
in itself justify restricting group relief to losses incurred by resident companies.”181 
This conclusion echoes the previous Lenz and Manninen, where the ECJ had held 
that “the principle of territoriality cannot justify different treatment of dividends 
distributed by companies established in Finland and those paid by companies 
established in other Member States, if the categories of dividends concerned by that 
difference in treatment share the same objective situation.”182 In other words, the ECJ 
had already made it very clear that the simple fact that a MS does not tax the profits 
in relation to which an imputation credit is given does not allow MSs to deny 
national treatment. Analogously, the fact that a MS does not tax profits of non-
resident subsidiaries is not by itself a reason for denying the offset of losses reported 
by foreign subsidiaries, as comparability between the their parent company and a 
parent company with resident subsidiaries can still be set. 
In light of this, it is argued here that, despite some adverse academic opinion183, 
ECJ’s comparability analysis is extremely consistent in applying a teleological 
interpretation of the relevant provisions.184 
Marks & Spencer is also clear in explaining how to identify the correct comparator 
from the origin-State perspective. 
In this latter scenario, the resident of the origin-MS, who exercised EU freedoms, 
must be compared with a resident of the same MS, who did not exercise EU 
freedoms. Accordingly, the right comparator for a resident which established foreign 
subsidiaries is a resident which opens resident subsidiaries, and not a resident with a 
foreign branch. This point however was discussed at the hearing before the Special 
Commissioners, where significant debate was committed to treatment of a company 
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resident in the UK creating foreign branches185, and featured also in the Special 
Commissioners’ decision186 and in the Opinion of AG Maduro to Marks & Spencer.187 
The identification of the correct comparator is made clear by the ECJ, where it 
highlighted that precluding group tax relief to a parent company on the grounds that 
its subsidiaries are non-resident “is of such a kind as to hinder the exercise of that 
parent company of its freedom of establishment by deterring it from setting 
subsidiaries in other Member States.”188 
This statement echoes the principles affirmed in Bosal where the ECJ had already 
held that the “difference in tax treatment in question concerns parent companies (…) 
all established in that Member State”189, while subsidiaries, being them resident or 
non-resident, are not involved.190 
This explains also the outcome of X Holding, where the taxpayer – a Dutch parent 
company – claimed that the domestic treatment of losses recorded by its Belgian 
subsidiary was incompatible with EU law, because received a less favorable 
treatment than if it had created a foreign permanent establishment, instead of 
establishing a non-resident subsidiary: as a matter of facts, a Dutch company with a 
permanent establishment abroad was allowed to temporary deduct the foreign losses 
from the domestic profits. 
The ECJ held that the Netherlands were not obliged to extend the (more 
favorable) treatment of losses incurred by permanent establishments to subsidiaries, 
because “[p]ermanent establishments situated in another Member State and non-
resident subsidiaries are not in a comparable situation with regard to the allocation 
of the power of taxation”191, as provided by a DTT. Even though the ECJ had held 
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that “the second sentence of the first paragraph of Article 43 EC leaves traders free to 
choose the appropriate legal form in which to pursue their activities”192, the MS of 
origin “remains at liberty to determine the conditions and level of taxation for 
different types of establishments chosen by national companies operating abroad, on 
condition that those companies are not treated in a manner that is discriminatory in 
comparison with comparable national establishments.”193 
X Holding explains paradigmatically how the comparator differs in origin-State 
and host-State perspectives: while in the latter a host-State company is compared to a 
non-national company (with a permanent establishment in the host-State), in the 
origin-State perspective “the comparator is not between a PE and a resident 
company; rather it is between a resident company exercising a fundamental freedom 
and a resident company conducting a similar operation domestically.”194 Thus, being 
a foreign permanent establishment and a non-resident subsidiary not comparable, 
the origin-MS remains free to apply two different (national) treatment to residents 
who are not in comparable situations, having chosen two different forms of 
establishment. 
 
5. “HOST-STATE” VS. “ORIGIN-STATE”: (DIRECT AND INDIRECT) 
DISCRIMINATION AND RESTRICTION 
From previous sections it is clear how comparability plays a key-role from both 
host-State and origin-State perspectives, given that discrimination and restriction 
occur only to the extent that the migrant is in a comparable situation to the non-
migrant. 
In this section, cases will be further categorized, starting from host-State cases. 
From the analysis conducted here, host-State’s provisions are capable to treat the 
non-national/resident differently by discriminating him or by restricting his exercise 
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of EU freedoms; in addition, both discrimination and restriction by the host-State can 
be grounded on nationality or on other criteria (e.g. tax residence). Thus, there is a 
combination of possibilities for the host-MS to apply different treatment than its own 
nationals/residents. 
First of all, discrimination on the grounds of nationality  (direct discrimination)195 
may occur: paradigmatic cases are Avoir fiscal and Royal Bank of Scotland.196 
In Avoir fiscal, the ECJ held that, even though nationality generally refers to 
natural persons, “[w]ith regard to companies, (…) their registered office (…) serves 
as the connecting factor with the legal system of a particular state, like nationality in 
the case of natural persons.”197 Accordingly, also companies can be discriminated on 
the grounds of nationality, if difference in treatment relates to the State of the seat, as 
in Avoir fiscal, where companies having their registered seat in another MS than 
France were denied the tax advantage available to French companies. 
A similar situation featured in Royal Bank of Scotland, where Greek rules provided 
for different tax-rates, depending upon whether companies had their seat in Greece 
(35% tax-rate applied) or in another MS (40% tax-rate applied). However, since 
national and foreign companies were found to be comparable given that the tax due 
was “calculated, in the case of both Greek and foreign companies, on net income (…), 
this being determined according to that method both for Greek companies and for 
foreign companies”198, direct discrimination occurred. 
Discrimination on the grounds of nationality is not the only possibility of 
different treatment by host-MSs. In this respect, the ECJ also held that “[t]he rules 
regarding equality of treatment (…) forbid also all covert forms of discrimination.”199 
Cases where covert or indirect discrimination featured are e.g. Biehl, Commerzbank, 
and Schumacker. 
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In Biehl, Luxembourg rules which provided for that tax deducted from salaries of 
taxpayers, resident during only a part of the year, were not repayable. Mr Biehl, 
resident and employed in Luxembourg until the end of October 1983, moved his 
residence to Germany and applied for refund. Luxembourg tax authority denied it, 
and maintained that the rules at stake “did not constitute discrimination prohibited 
by Community law.”200 In rejecting this argument, the ECJ applied the principle 
affirmed in Sotgiu and held that “[e]ven though the criterion of permanent residence 
(…) applies irrespective of the nationality of the taxpayer concerned, there is a risk 
that it will work in particular against (…) nationals of other Member States. It is often 
such persons who will in the course of the year leave the country (…).”201 
An analogous conclusion was reached in Commerzbank, where, under the relevant 
UK rules, a permanent establishment of a German bank was denied repayment 
supplement of overpaid tax “on the ground that the company was not resident in the 
United Kingdom.”202 The ECJ maintained that the criterion of tax residence was likely 
to affect mainly non-resident and constituted indirect discrimination. 
In addition, in Commerzbank, the ECJ cleared also how company’s seat and tax 
residence relate to direct and indirect discrimination, by stating that, “[a]lthough it 
applies independently of a company’s seat, the use of the criterion of fiscal residence 
within national territory (…) is liable to work more particularly to the disadvantage 
of companies having their seat in other Member States.”203 
This point is extremely important because the difference between direct and 
indirect discrimination is of extreme relevance when justifications come into play. 
While only an express Treaty derogation (e.g. public policy, public security or public 
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health provided for by Art. 52 TFEU) may justify direct discrimination204, indirect 
discrimination can be justified by imperative reasons in the public interest.205 
Coherently, in Royal Bank of Scotland, the ECJ stated that, “according to settled 
case law, only an express derogating provision, such as Article 56 of the EC Treaty, 
could render such discrimination compatible with Community law.”206 Similarly, in 
Avoir fiscal the ECJ had held that the risk of tax evasion cannot be relied upon as 
justification, because “Article 52 of the EEC Treaty does not permit any derogation 
(…) on such a ground.”207 
On the other hand, having regard to indirect discrimination, in Schumacker – 
where again the ECJ maintained that “tax benefits granted only to residents of a 
Member State may constitute indirect discrimination by reason of nationality”208 – the 
ECJ did not require TFEU derogations.209 In facts, although in rejecting them in the 
specific case, the ECJ analyzed whether the need to ensure cohesion of the tax 
system210 or administrative difficulties in ascertaining the income retrieved by the 
non-resident in his State of residence211 may justify the difference in treatment. 
In third instance, beside constituting direct and indirect discrimination, 
provisions laid down by host-MSs may also restrict, i.e. hinder, discourage, render 
less attractive, the exercise of EU freedoms.212 
An example of restriction from the host-State perspective is certainly Futura213: 
according to the relevant Luxembourg rules, whereas a non-resident company 
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“wishes to carry forward any losses incurred by its branch, it must keep (…) separate 
accounts for its branch’s activities complying with the tax accounting rules”214 of the 
host-MS, where such separate accounts must also be held. The ECJ highlighted that 
“such a condition may constitute a restriction (…) on the freedom of 
establishment.”215 In holding that the conditions laid down by Luxembourg 
constituted a restriction, the ECJ stated that such provisions may be justified by 
reasons of public interest, and applied the principles affirmed in Gebhard, namely 
that the provisions “have to be of such a nature as to ensure achievement of the aim 
in question and not go beyond what was necessary for that purpose.”216 Futura 
confirms that provisions constituting a restriction do not require Treaty justifications, 
but can be justified by “pressing reasons of public interest.”217 
This being said with reference to host-State cases, origin-State environment 
greatly differs for what concerns discrimination and restriction. 
From Daily Mail218, MSs are not in the position of laying down rules which treat its 
own nationals who exercised EU freedoms rights less favorably than its own 
nationals who did not. In the origin-State environment two nationals/residents, of the 
same MS are to be compared, and comparability analysis must ascertain whether the 
cross-border exercise of EU freedoms places the migrant in a different situation than 
the non-migrant. 
Once borne in mind that in the origin-State scenario nationality and residence of 
the subjects to be compared, i.e. the migrant and the non-migrant, do not differ, it is 
clear that in origin-State cases discrimination never features. 
                                                                                                                                                   
Contractors had held that a restriction can fall into two categories, namely “dislocation” (depending upon the 
interaction of the different tax systems of MSs) and “neutral” (not constituting discrimination nor dislocation, 
but having a demonstrable inhibiting effect). Critical towards Professional Contractors, O’SHEA, Marks, pp. 71-
72. On “dislocation”, also TERRA-WATTEL, European, pp. 58-59, who refer to it also as “Tax Base 
Fragmentation”. According to this categorization, Futura is a case of dislocation. 
214
 Futura, 25. 
215
 Futura, 24. 
216
 Futura, 26. 
217
 Futura, 26. 
218
 Daily Mail, 16. 
Student number 1141988 
43 
 
Indeed, having regard to Deutsche Shell219, it has been cleared that, from the origin-
MS perspective, “comparison is always between two nationals of that Member State 
and, as such, discrimination on the grounds of nationality does not enter the 
picture.”220 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
Different treatment is always admitted once different rules apply to different 
situation, or the same rules apply to similar situations. 
Within the direct tax field, the main distinguishing criterion is between the 
situations of residents and non-residents for tax purposes. 
This research proved that this is true also under EU law, whereas the ECJ has 
abundantly made it clear that, “[i]n relation to direct taxes, the situations of residents 
and of non-residents are not, as a rule, comparable.”221 
However, a distinction solely on the grounds of tax residence may allow MSs to 
discriminate nationals of other MSs or to restrict the exercise of EU freedoms. 
Thus, the ECJ – although recognizing the general principle of non-comparability – 
has identified to what extent comparability of residents and non-residents could be 
set. 
In doing so, the ECJ has focused its attention to the aim pursued by provisions 
laid down by MSs: this research has cleared that the ECJ conducted no comparability 
analysis without a teleological interpretation of the various rules at stake. 
This awareness allowed to reconcile a number of host-State cases, which at first 
glance may have seemed inconsistent, such as Schumacker, Gschwind, Asscher, and 
Gerritse, and ACT IV GLO, Denkavit, and Truck Center. 
Comparability was considered also from the origin-State perspective: in this 
scenario as well, an approach which took into account the goal-oriented 
interpretation adopted by the ECJ led the research to reconcile a number of origin-
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State cases dealing with dividends taxation, interest deduction, and cross-border 
loss-relief. 
Analysis of cases as host-State and origin-State cases proved to be essential in 
identifying the correct comparator and in highlighting how the comparator changes 
from the host-State and origin-State perspectives. On these grounds, Bosal, Marks & 
Spencer, and X Holding were reconciled. 
Furthermore, the results of the research on comparability led to categorize the 
different treatments between the migrant and the non-migrant that MSs may apply, 
from both host-State and origin-State perspectives. 
The final outcome of this research is that the ECJ showed extreme consistency of 
analysis in setting comparability between migrants and non-migrants, thus fulfilling 
its role of ensuring uniform interpretation of EU law, provided for by Art. 234 TFEU. 
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